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Abstract: In this paper we provide an evaluation and certification approach for
Voting Service Providers (VSPs) which combines the evaluation of the electronic
voting system and the operational environment for the first time. The VSP is a
qualified institution which combines a secure voting system and a secure
operational environment to provide secure remote electronic elections as a service
[La08]. This centralized approach facilitates legal regulation and evaluation. So
far, a legal regulation framework for VSPs has been developed which demands
evaluation and certification of the VSP [Sc09a]. Therefore the VSP is required to
provide a security concept in which it demonstrates satisfaction of the security
requirements defined in the legal regulation. However neither the content of this
security concept nor an adequate evaluation methodology has been specified so far.
We therefore developed a security concept template and a comprehensive
evaluation methodology for the VSP, which includes both the voting system and
operational environment of VSPs. Our proposal incorporates existing evaluation
methodologies to facilitate evaluation and certification. With this paper and the
legal regulation a realistic approach to enable the VSP concept is accomplished.
1 Introduction
Security is one of the most important goals in the field of electronic voting. A lot of
research has been done to develop sophisticated e-voting protocols with complex
cryptographic mechanisms to improve security. An additional approach to strengthen
security and trustworthiness is the evaluation and certification of e-voting systems.
Here the security functionality of a system is analyzed for compliance with a predefined
and approved set of requirements. In 2008 the first evaluation standards for online voting
systems were published–the “Common Criteria Protection Profile for Basic set of
security requirements for Online Voting Products” [sic] [VV08].
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However, in [Sc09b] the authors showed that the security of the operational
environment, in which the voting system is implemented, has to be considered as well.
One attempt to combine the security of a voting system with a secure operational
environment is the Voting Service Provider (VSP) concept [La08]. The VSP is a
qualified and professional institution which provides secure remote electronic elections
as a service on behalf of the election host. Therefore the VSP provides the secure
hardware and software, the voting system, the secure infrastructure as well as the
specialist knowledge and the skilled personnel needed to operate electronic elections
securely. The VSP is a centralized approach and thereby can be regulated and evaluated
easily. Legal regulation is an important means to provide a basis for security,
trustworthiness and correct behavior. A corresponding evaluation and certification
procedure can verify the compliance with such legal regulation. In [Sc09a] the authors
therefore introduced a legal framework for the regulation of VSPs. The framework
defines requirements for VSPs and demands their evaluation and certification. The legal
regulation stipulates that the evaluation and certification of VSPs is based on a ‘security
concept.’ In this security concept, the VSP needs to demonstrate how the requirements
of the legal framework are satisfied. The evaluation authority appointed in the statute
uses the security concept as the basis for evaluation and certification of the VSP. The
security concept comprises technical and organizational aspects, which have to be
addressed by the voting system and/or the operational environment. Concluding, the
centralized VSP concept and the legal framework provide an ideal basis for a combined
evaluation of the voting system and operational environment.
However neither the content of the security concept for VSPs nor an adequate evaluation
methodology has been specified so far. Therefore we developed a comprehensive
template for such a security concept for VSPs. Further we propose a combined
evaluation approach incorporating existing evaluation methodologies for both the voting
system and operational environment. We expand the Common Criteria evaluation for
online voting systems [VV08] by including an evaluation approach for the operational
environment based on the approved IT-Grundschutz/ISO270011 methodology [G08d]. In
this way we facilitate a fully comprehensive evaluation of VSPs and thereby enable the
VSP to be put into practice. Our approach is practical since already existing certificates
can be included in the evaluation thereby reducing costs and efforts of the VSP
evaluation.
We consider related work in Section 2. In Section 3 we develop a security concept
template as the basis for evaluation of VSPs. The template specifies which requirements
need to be considered. In Section 4 we introduce the Common Criteria and
IT-Grundschutz/ISO27001 certification methodologies and show how they can be used
in a security concept based VSP evaluation. In Section 5 we discuss the applicability of
these certification methodologies to the VSP scenario and conclude the paper.
1 eng.: IT Basic Protection/ISO27001
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2 Related Work
In the area of e-voting, evaluation is mainly considered in the Common Criteria
Protection Profile for online voting products [VV08], which we incorporated in our
work. Its development has been discussed in [VKG07]. Several companies are striving to
have their e-voting software certified accordingly, e.g. the Polyas voting software by
Micromata [RJ07].
Regarding the operational environment, there exist several methodologies. For example,
ITIL is a collection of best practices concentrating on IT service management and the
optimization of service quality2. However, ITIL is less security-oriented. A Swiss project
in Geneva is working on the implementation and evaluation of an e-voting system3. The
coordinators specified security requirements for their voting system4 and used the
ISO27001 methodology for evaluation which is a standard for Information Security
Management Systems (ISMS) [Re07, Tr09, Is08]. Our evaluation approach is more
comprehensive since it builds on a specialized legal regulation and incorporates the
Common Criteria Protection Profile [VV08], being the current evaluation standard for
online voting systems, which we expand by using the IT-Grundschutz/ISO27001”
methodology for evaluation of the operational environment. Thereby we extend the basic
ideas of the Swiss approach. Weldemariam et al. provided a more theoretical approach to
assess the operational environment of e-voting systems [WVM07]. In contrast, our work
focuses on the practicability of the evaluation in real-world scenarios.
In Germany, the evaluation of Certification Authorities (CAs) is based on an approach
similar to the VSP evaluation. The “German Signature Ordinance” legally regulates CAs
and requires them to provide a security concept (see [G01] § 2). However profound
information on the content of the security concept is missing thereby complicating the
CA evaluation. To improve the situation for VSPs, we therefore developed a detailed
security concept template facilitating VSP evaluation.
3 A Security Concept Template for Voting Service Providers
The legal framework introduced in [Sc09a] specifies only the basic structure of the
security concept for VSPs. We therefore developed a detailed security concept template
which contains all requirements a VSP must satisfy in order to comply with the legal
regulation. We point out that the legal framework for VSPs was developed in Germany







To identify the requirements, which have to be considered by the VSP in the security
concept to comply with the legal regulations [Sc09a], we deeply analyzed the legal
framework including the act and ordinance. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the
requirements by VSPs, we adapted these requirements to the technical field of
application. To this end, we analyzed the corresponding preambles of the legal
frameworks. They contain additional information which is relevant for implementation
and thereby facilitate concretizing the legal requirements. Moreover we incorporated
existing technical standards and requirements catalogs in order to further concretize and
supplement the requirements from the legal framework. Therefore we utilized recent
standards including the “Legal, Operational and Technical Standards for E-voting” from
the Council of Europe [Co04], which define comprehensive requirements for electronic
elections, as well as the catalog of requirements for the operational environment of
electronic elections presented in [Sc09b], which is based on a multitude of existing
literature on e-voting security. We used applicable requirements from these sources for
adapting the legal requirements to the technical field and integrated them in our
template. As a result many requirements from the catalog [Sc09b] and [Co04] have been
included in the template. We structured the resulting requirements based on the
provisions from the legal framework. Our approach and especially the incorporation of
existing technical standards are inspired by the interdisciplinary KORA5 methodology
[Ha92]. KORA describes a procedure to derive technical requirements and
implementation proposals from legal stipulations for the similar scenario of information
and communication systems. It has been tried and tested many times (see for example
[Ha94] and [Id00]).
3.2 Template Structure and Content
The legal framework provides a basic structure for the security concept. For our template
we adjusted the structure slightly in order to merge related requirements. Due to space
limitations, we cannot present the complete security concept template in this paper6. We
present the structure and an overview of the included requirements. We provide detailed
examples in Section 4.3.
Technical, structural and organizational safeguards: The VSP shall describe all
technical, structural and organizational measures essential for the operation of a VSP
according to the legal regulations. Here we incorporated the majority of requirements
from the catalog [Sc09b]. The section includes requirements for secure communication
channels that provide unaltered and confidential communication between the voter and
election server. Secure storage media must provide integrity, availability, and sufficient
capacity. Secure erasure of sensible data as well as archiving and system cleansing
measures must be provided.
5 Konkretisierung Rechtlicher Anforderungen, eng.: Implementation of legal requirements
6 The complete template will be published as a technical report shortly.
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The VSP must realize the management of cryptographic keys and certificates and correct
time for all system components. The VSP shall prevent attacks and unauthorized access
to the voting server. The VSP must ensure correct setup of the voting system, set and
publish time tables and register the voters correctly.
Technical products for remote electronic elections: The VSP shall list the technical
products used for its electronic voting services, e.g., electronic voting software or
election server hardware. If a product is certified this should be indicated here.
Setup and operation of remote electronic elections: The VSP shall demonstrate how it
achieves availability; confidentiality and integrity of the voting services and election
data; and how it realizes the operation of the election, the briefing of voters, and election
host. The VSP’s voting services must fulfill the election principles of the particular type
of election. It must achieve the secure identification and authentication of the voters. The
VSP must demonstrate how the legal requirements for ballot casting are satisfied
[Sc09a]. Integrity and verifiability of tallying must be accomplished. The VSP must
show how the election and adherence to law are documented and how integrity
protection and archiving of such data are achieved. The secure system state must be
ensured. This includes correct initial state, secure system interruption, and closure of the
voting phase. The VSP must ensure the secure delivery of authentication means to the
voters and correct representation of the electronic ballot.
Warranty of data protection: The VSP is required to prove that the applicable legal data
protection provisions, i.e., the German Federal Data Protection Act, the German State
Data Protection Act, and the German Teleservices Act, were observed. This can be
achieved by a data protection audit, e.g., by the German Independent Centre for Privacy
Protection Schleswig-Holstein7 or IT-Grundschutz, which provides a data protection
module8.
Guarantee and maintenance of operation: The VSP shall demonstrate the precautions
taken to guarantee and maintain the operation of the electronic voting service, especially
in case of emergencies.
Personnel: The VSP shall demonstrate that the employed personnel have the reliability
(i.e., guarantee that the legal provisions regarding the VSP’s operation are observed) and
the specialist qualifications (i.e., the knowledge, experience and skills necessary for their
work).
Residual security risks: The VSP must assess and value remaining security risks in order
to evaluate its reliability. This relates to the residual risk of system failure or interruption
in particular with regard to deployed technology. The VSP may refer to valuation from





4 Combined Evaluation Approach
The legal framework [Sc09a] for VSPs does not demand a specific methodology for
evaluating the security concept. However the incorporation of existing evaluation
certificates is explicitly allowed. The intention is to facilitate the evaluation process and
avoid double checking. We show how this approach can be realized by applying two
approved evaluation methodologies for both voting system and operational environment
to the security concept evaluation. We analyzed the requirements contained in our
security concept template and found that many requirements are satisfied by either a
voting system certified according to the Common Criteria Protection Profile [VV08] or
by safeguards for the operational environment from the IT-Grundschutz/ISO27001
catalogs [G05]. To this end we compared both the ‘objectives’ of the Protection Profile
and the ‘modules’ and safeguards from the IT-Grundschutz/ISO27001 catalogs with the
requirements from our template. We describe this in more detail in the following
sections. By utilizing an accordingly certified voting system and a certified operational
environment, the security concept evaluation effort is reduced to evaluating only a few
remaining requirements not covered by those certificates. We therefore propose to
combine these methodologies for the security concept based evaluation of VSPs.
Thereby we enable the combined evaluation and make it usable for the VSP evaluation.
We introduce the methodologies in the following sections. While the IT-Grundschutz
methodology originates in Germany, we point out that the “IT-Grundschutz based on
ISO27001” certification is internationally accepted, as is Common Criteria.
4.1 Common Criteria
The “Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation” (CC) is an
international standard (ISO/IEC 15408) for computer security evaluation and
certification9. CC focuses on the evaluation of IT products like hardware or software
components. Besides the evaluation of concrete products, CC allows specifying
generalized security requirements for a family of products in a ‘Protection Profile’ (PP).
Manufactures thereby are enabled to develop corresponding products. An evaluation
authority then evaluates and certifies the compliance of the product’s security
functionality with the PP. In 2008, the German Federal Office for Information Security
certified and published the “Common Criteria Protection Profile for Basic set of security
requirements for Online Voting Products” [sic] [VV08]. This PP specifies basic security
requirements for online voting system software for non-political elections with low
attack potential. The included requirements represent the essential foundation upon
which voting systems for all election scenarios can build. It is an important step towards
the certification of e-voting systems and is therefore planned to be mandatory for such
systems in Germany. For our evaluation approach, the PP ‘objectives’ and ‘assumptions’
are relevant. The objectives specify the security goals which certified voting software is
able to achieve.
In order to achieve these security objectives several assumptions are assumed to be
realized, which cannot be achieved by the voting software. These assumptions must be
satisfied by the operational environment. We show how PP-certified voting software can
9 http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/
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facilitate the evaluation of a VSP. Our analysis revealed that many requirements
included in the VSP’s security concept can be fulfilled by such certified voting software
and therefore do not need to be evaluated again in the VSP evaluation (see Section 4.3).
Moreover we expanded the PP approach: since we incorporated the requirements from
the catalog [Sc09b] into the security concept template (see Section 3.1), we especially
included the assumptions towards the operational environment from the PP because
these are contained in the catalog. Consequently a certified VSP realizes the secure
operational environment assumed necessary in the PP to achieve the security objectives
of the voting software. We discuss the applicability of the PP to the VSP scenario in
Section 5. For further details on PP evaluation we refer to [VV08] and [VK07].
4.2 IT-Grundschutz/ISO27001
IT-Grundschutz (eng.: IT Basic Protection) provides a methodology to ensure and certify
the security of complex ‘information domains’ which consist of infrastructural,
organizational, personnel and technical components. IT-Grundschutz includes a
comprehensive catalog of safeguards which can be implemented in order to satisfy
protection requirements [G05]. The evaluation and certification methodology of
IT-Grundschutz has been adapted to incorporate the methodology and the generic
requirements on information security management systems from ISO27001 [Is08].
ISO27001 is an approved international standard that specifies requirements for the
introduction, operation and improvement of information security management systems
(ISMS) [KRS08]. It includes a sophisticated risk management methodology. ISO27001
is the first international standard for information security management that allows
certification [G08a]. While ISO27001 specifies requirements, it only provides a very
limited number of rather indefinite safeguards to fulfill those requirements.
IT-Grundschutz can fill this gap by providing a multitude of concrete safeguards which
can be used to satisfy the generic requirements from ISO27001. A synthesis of
IT-Grundschutz and ISO27001 therefore seems plausible [KRS08]. Moreover,
IT-Grundschutz includes predefined risk assessment to avoid a complex risk analysis at
least in scenarios with normal protection levels. Concluding, the
IT-Grundschutz/ISO27001 approach facilitates implementation of the ISO27001
methodology by providing an immense set of safeguards and decreases efforts by
reducing the need for costly risk analysis. Compared to classical risk analysis the
IT-Grundschutz approach is more cost-effective and has been tested in practice for many
years [G08a]. An IT-Grundschutz/ISO27001 certification always includes an official
ISO27001 certification, but, due to the additionally audited technical aspects, is more
informative. The evaluation is performed by an external auditor certified by the German
Federal Office for Information Security. In order to prove the achieved security level,
IT-Grundschutz includes a certification methodology. There are three certification levels;
the most comprehensive one is the ‘ISO27001 certification based on IT-Grundschutz,’
which incorporates the procedures and requirements of ISO27001 certification based on
IT-Grundschutz safeguards.
The certification procedure comprises inspections of the reference documents, on-site
inspection, and the generation of audit reports. For lower security level certification,
IT-Grundschutz provides the less comprehensive and less costly ‘entry level’ (lowest
level) and the ‘continuation level’ (intermediate level). The certification level is reflected
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in according to safeguard categories. While the entry level certification only requires the
implementation of safeguards of category A, the continuation level requires A and B.
The ISO27001 certificate based on IT-Grundschutz requires all safeguards –A, B,
and C– to be implemented. The additional ‘Z’ safeguards present supplements that can
be used in case of higher security requirements.
4.2.1 IT-Grundschutz procedure
We describe the procedure an institution has to perform in order to secure its information
domain according to the IT-Grundschutz methodology [G08a, G08b].
At first, the architecture, components, and processes of the information domain must be
identified and documented. This is done in the structure analysis. Subsequently, the
determining of protection requirements assesses the level of protection that is
appropriate for the particular objects specified in the structure analysis. All objects are
analyzed in regard to the potential damage that could result from an impairment of the
protective goals of confidentiality, integrity or availability. Then the protection
requirement for each object of the structural analysis is classified as “normal,” “high,” or
“very high.” Next, the selection and adaptation of safeguards must be accomplished. In
this modeling process, the prior identified objects of the information domain are
associated with respective IT-Grundschutz modules. The modules are comprised of
generic aspects (e.g., personnel, contingency planning), infrastructure (e.g., server
room), IT systems (e.g., laptop), networks (e.g., WLAN), and applications (e.g.,
database). Each module is associated with specific safeguards suitable to protect the
module from typical threats. The safeguards are classified in the categories A (entry
level), B (continuation level), C (certificate) and Z (additional) in accordance with the
targeted certification level. All safeguards must be examined and adapted to the specific
scenario to ensure the appropriate function. Adaptations must be documented. The result
of the procedure is an IT-Grundschutz model for use as a test plan for an existing
information domain or as a development plan for an information domain in planning.
Next, the basic security check is performed to provide an overview over the existing
security level by comparing current state and target state. Therefore applicability and
current implementation status of each selected safeguard are checked. The basic security
check reveals where additional steps have to taken in order to implement the
IT-Grundschutz safeguards.
4.2.2 Handling special requirements
For efficiency reasons, IT-Grundschutz uses a two-stage approach. In the first stage, a
normal protection level and a typical application scenario are assumed. Here, the
IT-Grundschutz safeguards provide an adequate security level. These safeguards can be
determined quickly and efficiently allow for increases in the security level of the
information domain.
However, in some scenarios, especially in an electronic election scenario, some objects
might require safeguards at a higher security level. Therefore IT-Grundschutz provides
the supplementary security analysis in the second stage. At first, it is applied to objects
whose protection requirement was classified “high” or “very high” in regard to at least
one of the protective goals of confidentiality, integrity or availability in the preceding
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analysis. Secondly, a supplementary security analysis is indicated, if a very specific
object cannot be modeled appropriately due to the lack of respective IT-Grundschutz
modules. At last, objects which can be modeled with IT-Grundschutz modules, but
which are deployed in an untypical way or in an untypical environment shall undergo a
supplementary security analysis as well. IT-Grundschutz provides several options on
how to handle such special requirements. First, the before mentioned additional ‘Z’-
safeguards can be implemented to achieve a higher protection level. If not sufficient, an
additional risk analysis needs to be performed. IT-Grundschutz/ISO27001 recommends a
risk analysis approach described in [G08c]. The intention is to determine threats to the
information domain that are not considered sufficiently by the regular IT-Grundschutz
safeguards and to find appropriate safeguards. We sketch the basic steps. For all target
objects the basic IT-Grundschutz threats are listed. Additional threats are determined by
analyzing the specific protection requirements and the operating scenario for the target
objects. Threat probability and potential damage are assessed. The protection level of
implemented safeguards is checked. Next, measures are determined to handle the risks–
risks can be reduced by additional safeguards, risks can be avoided (e.g., by restructuring
business processes), risks can be transferred (e.g., by insurance policies) and under
certain circumstances (e.g., low threat probability upon extremely costly safeguards),
risks can be accepted and therefore remain. Such residual risks must be assessed and
documented. Next a second basic security check is performed to check whether the
security level has been improved. At last, IT-Grundschutz allows for adaptation by
adding new modules to describe threats and safeguards for specific components which
are not included in the IT-Grundschutz catalog so far. We discuss the applicability of
IT-Grundschutz/ISO27001 to the VSP scenario in Section 5.
4.3 Incorporating Protection Profile and IT-Grundschutz
We demonstrate how the proposed PP and IT-Grundschutz/ISO27001 evaluation
methodologies can be incorporated in the security concept based VSP evaluation. In our
security concept template we linked respective requirements to corresponding PP
objectives, meaning that these requirements are covered by the referenced objectives and
therefore satisfied by PP-certified voting software. Respectively, to each requirement
that has to be satisfied by the operational environment, we linked suitable
IT-Grundschutz safeguards. To this end, we assumed a generalized VSP architecture and
components and mapped them to IT-Grundschutz modules. Our results thereby also
show how utilizing PP-certified voting software and incorporating existing
IT-Grundschutz/ISO27001 can reduce costs and efforts in the VSP evaluation. Due to
space limitations, we are restricted to presenting examples from our security concept
template. In the first example a PP-certified voting system would significantly reduce the
extent of evaluation. We list the applicable PP objectives that are achieved by a certified
voting system. For their complete description, we refer to [VV08].
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BALLOT CASTING
References: VSP act § 8, VSP ordinance § 3
PP objectives: O.Abort (b), O.OneVoterOneVote (b), O.Correction (c),
O.Acknowledgement (d), O.Proof (e)
The VSP must ensure that the voters
a) are able to cast an invalid vote,
b) are able to abort the voting procedure without losing elective franchise,
c) are able to correct their vote any number of times until the final voting,
d) receive a confirmation for their vote,
e) are not enabled by the voting system to show their voting decision to others.
Besides a), all aspects are completely satisfied by a PP-certified voting system. The
evaluation authority only needs to ensure that a) is fulfilled.
The next example shows how PP assumptions are integrated into the security concept
template and how they can be satisfied by IT-Grundschutz safeguards [G05].
SYSTEM TIME
References: Operational environment requirements catalog [Sc09b]
PP assumption: A.SystemTime
IT-Grundschutz safeguards: B 3.3 Network components (S 4.227 Use of a local NTP
server for time synchronization), B5 Security of applications (S 5.67 Use of a time
stamp service)
The VSP must make the correct time and time stamps available to the voting system,
conforming to the actual time. The required exactness is defined by the election host.
The accuracy of the time source shall be sufficient to maintain time marks for audit
trails and observations data, as well as for maintaining the time limits for registration,
nomination, voting, or counting.
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In this case, the referenced IT-Grundschutz safeguards satisfy the assumption.
IT-Grundschutz safeguards can also be used to satisfy many other requirements from the
security concept; e.g., “Guarantee and maintenance of operation” (see Section 3.2) can
be realized by implementing the modules “B 1.3 Contingency planning concept” and “B
1.8 Handling security incidents” [G05].
However, our findings revealed that IT-Grundschutz safeguards cannot cover all of the
requirements in the template. For example, the voter registration or secure delivery of
authentication means cannot be described appropriately by IT-Grundschutz. Availability
or integrity safeguards from the IT-Grundschutz might not be sufficient for all election
scenarios. We explain how to proceed in the next section.
4.4 Application guideline
To apply the security concept template we recommend that the VSP performs the
IT-Grundschutz procedure described above in order to define the specific protection
requirements of its system and to analyze to what extent the IT-Grundschutz safeguards
referenced in the template fulfill these requirements. If certain requirements cannot be
covered, a supplementary security analysis and, based on its result, a risk analysis should
be performed. Remaining risks identified in this analysis have to be noted in the Section
“Residual security risks” in the security concept (see Section 3.2).
If the VSP already has an IT-Grundschutz certificate which includes the respective
safeguards noted in the template, the particular requirements are satisfied and do not
need to be evaluated again. Otherwise the linked safeguards serve as a recommendation
on how to satisfy the requirements. However, the operational environment is no plug-in
component with exactly defined functional properties; IT-Grundschutz safeguards must
always be adjusted to the specific local conditions. Therefore the applicability of an
existing IT-Grundschutz certificate to the security concept and the election scenario
always must be checked by the evaluation authority.
If PP-certified voting software is utilized, the VSP can skip the implementation of
safeguards for the requirements which are already satisfied by the certified voting
software. The evaluation authority only must evaluate whether the remaining
requirements have been satisfied. This reduces the costs and effort of conducting a VSP
evaluation. To optimize the evaluation, voting software manufacturers could include the
fulfillment of these remaining requirements for the voting software from our template to
their CC certification to prove not only PP-compliance, but additional ‘VSP-suitability.’
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Figure 1: Application of evaluation methodologies
We illustrate our evaluation approach and the incorporation of the PP and
IT-Grundschutz/ISO27001 as well as the legal framework and the security concept
template in Figure 1.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
We discuss the pros and cons of IT-Grundschutz/ISO27001 and its applicability to the
VSP scenario. Alternative certification methodologies like pure ISO27001 are mostly
based on a general risk analysis approach. Threats and safeguards have to be determined
from scratch. These are complex and costly tasks. In IT-Grundschutz, these steps are
already integrated in every module of the IT-Grundschutz catalog. The large number of
IT-Grundschutz safeguards simplifies implementation and can support the design
process of VSPs. Hence, IT-Grundschutz evaluation is practicable. This supports the
VSP approach. Basically, these safeguards ensure a normal security level for typical
threats. This might not be sufficient for particular e-voting scenarios. However,
IT-Grundschutz provides supplementary security analysis and risk analysis to adapt to
special scenarios with higher protection requirements. Moreover new specific e-voting
modules may be added to the IT-Grundschutz catalog. Consequently IT-Grundschutz
seems applicable to the e-voting scenario and is a good choice for the certification of the
operational environment of VSPs. Moreover, since many computer centers or similar IT
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service providers already have IT-Grundschutz certificates, it facilitates their evaluation
in case they want to provide electronic voting services as VSPs.
However, in the case of already existing IT-Grundschutz/ISO27001 certification the
implemented safeguards need to be checked during the VSP evaluation for their
suitability in the e-voting scenario. The effort should be determined and assessed in
practical tests. Furthermore IT-Grundschutz is mostly used in Germany. This might
reduce acceptance abroad. However, since the legal framework for VSPs is built for the
German context, this does not affect the integration of IT-Grundschutz in the security
concept evaluation.
The applicability of the PP to the VSP scenario is obvious. To develop a state-of-the-art
evaluation approach, we need to incorporate this important evaluation concept for voting
software. Admittedly, the PP is intended only for non-political election scenarios with
low attack potential. However, it represents a foundation of requirements all other
election scenarios build upon. Furthermore, since the legal framework for VSPs includes
non-political elections as well, the PP perfectly fits into the VSP scenario. Regarding the
incorporation of the PP into the VSP evaluation, this is an improvement on both sides;
from the VSP perspective, using PP-certified voting software significantly facilitates the
VSP evaluation. From the PP perspective, our VSP evaluation approach closes the gap
of the PP evaluation because now the VSP is certified to achieve all open PP
assumptions towards the operational environment. Thereby an overall evaluation is
achieved. A VSP certified according to the security concept template complies with the
legal framework, it represents the required operational environment for voting systems
certified according to the PP, and it achieves the state-of-the-art in operational
environment security as demanded in [Sc09b]. We point out that our combined
evaluation approach of voting system and operational environment might be adapted to
other e-voting scenarios outside the VSP context. However the existing legal framework,
the security concept and the centralized design make the VSP scenario an ideal basis.
In this paper we presented a security concept template for VSPs and a corresponding
evaluation methodology. By incorporating existing evaluation methodologies into the
security concept evaluation, we presented a realistic approach which reduces the costs
and effort of an evaluation. Concluding our work helps to enable the VSP concept and
improves e-voting evaluation by combining the evaluation of voting systems and
operational environment.
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